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FREEDOM AND PRISON: PUTTING STRUCTURALISM BACK INTO
STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY

Anders Walker*

ABSTRACT
Critics of structural racism frequently miss structuralism
as a field of historical inquiry. This essay reviews the
rise of structuralism as a mode of historical analysis and
applies it to the mass incarceration debate in the United
States, arguing that it enriches the work of prevailing
scholars in the field.
I. INTRODUCTION

Structuralism has become a prominent frame for discussions of
race and inequality in the United States, part of a larger trend that
began in the wake of Barack Obama’s presidential victory in 2008.
This victory was a moment that inspired some to herald a “postracial” America and others to insist that persistent disparities
continued to plague the United States, particularly in the context of
criminal justice.1 No one made this point more forcefully than legal
scholar Michelle Alexander, who argued in 2010 that not only had
America failed to move beyond race, but the United States had
spawned a new mode of racial controla New Jim Crow, as she put
itthat relied on prisons and police to put “blacks back in their
place.”2
Alexander drew from the language of structuralism to counter
conservative claims about incarceration as a logical outgrowth of
poor moral choices, noting that “racism manifests itself not only in
individual attitudes and stereotypes, but also in the basic structure of
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society.”3 To illustrate, she invoked the metaphor of a birdcage,
positing that “any given wire of the cage may or may not be
specifically developed for the purpose of trapping the bird,” yet when
“arranged in a specific way, and connected to [other wires],” still
“serve to enclose the bird and to ensure that it cannot escape.”4 Mass
incarceration was precisely such an arrangement, she argued,
featuring “a wide variety of laws, institutions, and practicesranging
from racial profiling to biased sentencing policies, political
disenfranchisement, and legalized employment discrimination [to]
trap African Americans in a virtual (and literal) cage.”5
Despite her intriguing allegory of a multi-intentioned cage,
Alexander spent little time considering whether policies that lacked
racial animus may have contributed to mass incarceration, preferring
instead to focus on the survival of invidious intentboth explicit and
implicitin the post-Jim Crow era.
As she described it,
“conservative whites” retained a deep commitment to white
supremacy, and simply shifted from overt to covert racism following
the end of formal Jim Crow, developing “a race-neutral language” to
maintain a “racial caste system.”6
While many found Alexander’s argument compelling, the
question of racial animus remained a prominent, if unexplained,
aspect of her work. If whites did in fact want to resubordinate
African Americans post-Jim Crow, where did this desire come from?
Was it learned? Was it the product of a defect of the white mind? Or
was it the product of lived experience, i.e. observations of the natural
world that were then interpreted in a way that reinforced racial
stereotypes? Alexander did not say for certain, preferring to focus on
how invidious intent lurked behind ostensibly neutral policies.
However, she did hint at a structural source, one that she located in
“human nature.”7 “It’s not that white people are more unjust than
others,” she observed, “[r]ather it seems that an aspect of human
nature is the tendency to cling tightly to one’s advantage and
privileges and to rationalize the suffering and exclusion of others.”8
The question of human nature remains, at its core, a structural
one: a case for locating the origins of human behavior, including
3
4
5
6
7
8

Id. at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 257–58.
Id.
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racist behavior, in the biological structures of the mind.9 However,
Alexander’s jump to biological causes proved an odd turn in her
otherwise detailed account of a birdcage of ostensibly race-neutral
laws and policies, a story that would seem to lend itself to
contingency and complexity. Further, much of Alexander’s book
dedicated itself to unveiling hidden racial animus, not explaining the
origins of that animus.10
Despite her invocation of structuralism, in other words,
Alexander’s study of mass incarceration is in fact something quite
different. She tells us not where racial animus comes from, but how
it masquerades itself, a process more akin to the post-structuralist
practice of deconstruction, not the structuralist project of locating
underlying causes of particular worldviews, or “mentalités.”11 To
illustrate, this essay will provide a brief review of structuralism,
locate Alexander’s argument in the field, and then demonstrate how
critiques of her argument might point us to a more genuinely
structuralistrather than post-structuralistaccount of mass
incarceration in the United States.
II. STRUCTURALISM

Notions of structuralism owe their origins to the building trades
which, as early as the fifteenth century in Europe, invoked the term
“structure” to refer to “the action of building,” or what we today
would term “construction.”12 During the course of the seventeenth
century, this terminology evolved in two directions, towards the
“product of building,” as in a wooden or stone “structure,” but also
the “manner of building,” meaning the way in which “constituent
parts” of a building made up a “whole.”13 This latter iteration
became popular in other fields, including biology and anatomy, in the
seventeenth century, to explain the internal workings, or “internal
structure[s]” of human parts, like for example, hands.14 That which
was structural, in other words, explained the component parts
necessary to make things workbone, muscle, ligaments, and so

9

See Gordon H. Orians, Nature & Human Nature, 137 DAEDALUS 39, 44 (2008).
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 2.
11
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onwhile that which was not structural could simply be written off
as superfluous, or “decorative.”15
By the turn of the twentieth century, structuralist ideas crept into
fields as disparate as botany, geology, chemistry, and engineering –
but remained largely a matter of the naturalnot humansciences.16
Students of the human sciences tended to explain their subjects in
terms of personal agency and historical contingency, not the
predetermined results of “deep permanent structures” but the
consequence of individual moral choice.17
However, an early form of structuralism did find inroads in the
study of one topic: race. As early as the sixteenth century, for
example, Europeans traveling to Africa reported on startling physical
differences between themselves and Africans, most notably in terms
of skin color.18 Such differences then became the basis for
widespread, rambling theories of intelligence, culture, and identity,
what historian Winthrop Jordan has termed “an irresistible
playground for awakening scientific curiosity,” that later became
linked to particular types of legal control, like slavery.19 For
example, scientists at the turn of the nineteenth century began to
argue that racial difference could be measured by examining physical
attributes, including cranial structure.20
This idea, termed
phrenology, became widely popular in the United States during the
antebellum period, and was wheeled out by southerners interested in
rationalizing human bondage.21 As early as 1837, for example, a
physician named Charles Caldwell concluded that African skulls
were shaped in such a way as to suggest that they were more
“tamable” than whites, and therefore better suited to be slaves.22
By the 1840s, such notions declined in prominence, only to be
replaced by an updated variant known as craniometry, which surged
in the 1880s and 1890s and held that detailed measurements of skull
capacity could explain intellectual prowess, not just for individuals

15

Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO 4–5
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(1968).
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Id. at 12.
See BRUCE R. DAIN, A HIDEOUS MONSTER OF THE MIND: AMERICAN RACE THEORY IN THE EARLY
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but entire groups.23 Such ideas took hold in a rising discipline
dedicated to the study of human civilization, anthropology, and
contributed to a surge of scientific theories about race in the 1880s
and 1890s that became central to the rise of Jim Crow in the
American South.24
Meanwhile, another branch of anthropology emerged that focused
not on skull size, but the physical process of perception. Claude
Levi-Strauss argued that human beings shared a common mode of
perception due to the structure of their minds, and that this structure
then influenced cultural development, a view that came to be
identified as “structuralist,” and that was inspired by earlier theories
of human language.25
French historian Fernand Braudel joined Levi-Strauss’s efforts to
find structural causes of human behavior, looking beyond human
perception to the natural environment, including geography and
climate.26 Braudel maintained that human perception (and human
action) depended heavily on the physical interaction of humans and
their environments, particularly over long periods of time, or what he
termed the “longue durée.”27 To explain why, Braudel penned a
path-breaking history of the Mediterranean world, arguing that
proximity to water, climate, and other physical factors explained the
history of the region better than individual leaders, ideas, or events.28
Rather than read history as a procession of great men doing great
things, in other words, Braudel focused on the “interaction between
natural and cultural milieus” that gave rise to such men, including the
work of historically marginalized populations dependent on the land,
like serfs and slaves, as well as the importance of collective thinking
over individual ideas, or what Braudel called mentalités.29
Braudel’s approach to history came to be associated with an
entire school of thought focused on a particular journal, the Annales
d’Histoire Economique et Sociale, or simply Annales, that focused on
the lives of average people, not elites, and captured European

23

See id. at 211–15.
See Gregory P. Downs, University Men, Social Science, and White Supremacy in North
Carolina, 75 J. OF SOUTHERN HIST. 267, 270 (2009) (discussing how white supremacy became an idea
discussed at southern universities).
25
See Peter Schottler, Historians and Discourse Analysis, 27 HIST. WORKSHOP 37, 39–41 (1989).
26
See Chase, supra note 11, at 416.
27
See id.
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attention from the 1940s through the 1970s.30 Annales historians
took Braudel’s basic methodology and applied it to a variety of
contexts, often using it to downplay political, intellectual, and
military history, arguing instead that the continuities in the daily lives
of forgotten people were more significant to understanding the past
than dramatic moments, heroic leaders, or “the instant drama and
distortions of the ‘media event.’”31
The Annales school’s resistance to grand narrative brought it into
conflict with scholars from other fields, some of whom rejected
structuralism outright, and others who posited a variety of “poststructuralist” theories of history that included bits and pieces of the
Annales approach.32
For example, French philosopher Louis
Althusser applied structuralism to Marxist theory, using it to explain
how capitalist systems relied on public and private platforms to
influence popular culture, thereby winning the support of the working
class.33 Structural Marxists joined Annales historians in downplaying
personal agency and private moral choice, preferring instead to view
human actionincluding popular thought and private dissent, such as
crimeas a byproduct of the situations that individuals found
themselves in.34 However, they did believe in the possibility of
dramatic events, foremost among them revolution (against the
capitalist order) that could be accelerated through Marxist teaching.35
Others, like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, borrowed from
structuralism to challenge conventional notions of historical change
generally, arguing instead for the “de-construction” of historical
categories, a notion that questioned the permanence of deepBraudellian structures, and emphasized instead the hidden power
relations beneath even the most objectively neutral categories.36
Crime, madness, mythology, and language all struck Derrida and
Foucault as malleable, politically fraught areas of inquiry that
obscured deeper contests.37

30

Chase, supra note 11, at 415.
Id. at 418.
32
See Lynn Hunt, French History in the Last Twenty Years: The Rise and Fall of the Annales Paradigm,
21 J. OF CONTEMP. HIST. 209, 217–19, 221 (1986).
33
See id. at 221.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
Gertrude Himmelfarb, Some Reflections on the New History, 94 AM. HIST. REV. 661, 665–68 (1989);
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By the 1980s, aspects of post-structuralist thinking began to
capture the attention of legal scholars in the United States, prompting
them to question the neutrality of legal rules, an inquiry that led to the
rise of critical legal studies in the 1980s and critical race theory in the
1990s.38 Critical race theory maintained that objectively neutral legal
rules could be deconstructed to find hidden racial animus in a variety
of legal fields, including criminal law, a project that Michelle
Alexander undertook in her widely acclaimed book, The New Jim
Crow, published in 2010.39
As Alexander told it, the story of mass incarceration appeared on
its face to be the byproduct of a racially-neutral campaign to control
crime but was in fact a veiled effort to subordinate blacks.40 To
demonstrate, she cited statistics suggesting that suburban whites used
drugs more extensively than did urban blacks but were policedand
punishedless.41 The rationale for this, she argued, was racial bias,
particularly bias on the part of “white conservatives” who did not
really care about preventing drug abuse, but were in fact more
interested in rebuilding a system of racial control that might replace
the one extant in the American South during the era of Jim Crow.42
On its face, the argument had a heavy deconstructionist bent,
exposing white animus in places that made no overt mention of race,
a classic post-structuralist move. To the extent the argument was
structuralist, it relied heavily on the permanence of racial
animusand by extension racialized thinking generallyas a feature
of American society, a mentalité of sorts that was also part of its
longue durée. Alexander hinted that this may have stemmed from
basic human nature, a biological proclivity by elites to rationalize
their privilege; this, however, did not explain precisely why race was
the chosen rubric for elite rule, nor why mass incarceration was
greater in the United States than in other countries with similar
racially-polarized demographics.43
To answer that question, more would need to be known about the
transmission of racist ideas, and also any factors that might make
those ideas more persuasive than their alternative, non-racist variants.

38

See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Derrick A. Bell,
Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893 (1995).
39
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 2.
40
Id. at 40.
41
Id. at 98–99.
42
Id. at 43.
43
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 2.
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Such questions lend themselves to a structuralist, rather than poststructuralist, account, as the next section shall demonstrate.
III. ANIMUS

That racial animus explains mass incarceration is a reasonable
claim, particularly if one takes into account the long history of racial
thinking, and racial science, in America. For example, one could
locate the persistence of white animus not in human nature per se, but
rather in scientific claims about black biological inferiority
rootedironicallyin structuralist arguments about race and
physical appearance that first emerged during the colonial period.44
Though Alexander does not get into this story, she could have used it
to support her structuralist argument about the birdcage of criminal
justice, arguing, for example, that racialist thinking was a type of
mentalité, i.e. not simply a single theory or idea, but a whole realm of
thought that captured the nation both before and after the Civil
Wareven into the post-Civil Rights Era. To establish this point,
Alexander could simply have canvassed the long history of racist
science in the United States, beginning with phrenology and
continuing on through the rise of anthropology, biology, genetics, and
a variety of other disciplines that openly endorsed notions of black
inferiority as late as the 1930s.45
Only by the close of World War II did such science lose formal
credibility, but even then many Americans continued to believe it
precisely because it had become part of the mental furniture of the
United States, a view expressed in myriad ways and on myriad
platforms, not just in scientific journals, for example, but in public
media and popular culture as well.46 Americans who graduated
college in the 1930s, for example, may simply have adhered to the
racist ideas that they had absorbed growing up, carrying them well
into the 1960s and beyond. The structuralist frame of a mentalité
captures this problem, explaining how certain ideas might continue to
survive even though they have been formally discredited as a matter
of sciencebedeviling policy for decades to come.47 This would
44

JORDAN, supra note 18 at 96–97.
See generally DAIN, supra note 20.
46
Id. at 197–204.
47
See generally IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE ACCOUNT OF RACIST
IDEAS IN AMERICA (2016).
45
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explain, for example, why elites might have worked to reinscribe
racial hierarchy in neutral terms during the 1980s, as Alexander
claims, a move that stemmed from a heartfeltif deludedbelief
about human difference that stemmed from a much larger mentalité.48
However, racial animus may not have been the only cause of
mass incarceration. In Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment
in Black America, James Forman Jr. challenges Alexander’s singular
focus on white animus, focusing instead on the rise of violent crime
in America in the 1970s, and then on the African American
response.49 Using Washington, D.C. as an example, Forman makes
the startling claim that African American voters themselves lobbied
for longer prison sentences and more police, along with conservative
whites.50 Forman concedes Alexander’s point about white animus
and drugs, in other words, but goesfurther, demonstrating that in
Washington, D.C. the problem of black drug use may not have been
as serious as white use in the suburbs, but differed in that it coincided
with a proliferation of firearms, and that guns became the weapon of
choice for drug distributors, who used extreme violence to eliminate
competitors and terrorize the city.51
Drug-related violence, maintains Forman, became so intolerable
that African American majorities themselves voted for higher prison
sentences and more police, effectively joining white conservatives in
what Alexander has termed mass incarceration.52 Rather than a
product of some outdated racialist mentalité, in other words, Forman
suggests that the story in Washington was a tale of rational choices
that had unanticipated effects.
But this too may be a structuralist tale. Forman’s story presses us
to look more closely, for example, at the structural causes of crime in
the United States in the 1960s and 1970sa topic that Alexander
ignores. Further, Forman’s nuanced description of debates within
Washington, D.C.’s African American community suggests that both
cultural and structural forces contributed to mass incarceration’s rise,
perhaps even its inevitability.53

48

ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 40.
See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA
9–14 (2017).
50
See id. at 43–46, 51, 60–61, 107–11, 115.
51
Id. at 17, 39, 51, 126, 136, 145.
52
Id. at 43–46, 60–61; See ALEXANDER, supra note 2.
53
See FORMAN, supra note 49, at 17–46.
49
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According to criminologist Barry Latzer, for example, the “late1960s” witnessed the “biggest sustained escalation in criminal
violence in the United States since the 1870s,” a development that
affected African Americans “to a much greater degree” than whites.54
From 1960 to 1970, argues Latzer, “urban homicide rates” doubled in
the United States, part of a trend that could only be partially
explained by increased birth rates following World War II’s “baby
boom.”55 “[N]onwhite males were responsible for 77 percent” of the
increase, argues Latzer, yet only “[t]wenty-seven percent of the
nonwhite male homicide spike was attributable to a rise in the size of
that population.”56
That police focused more heavily on urban blacks than suburban
whites, a core aspect of Alexander’s argument, did notin Latzer’s
analysisexplain the spike in black violence, which was reflected
not only in arrest records, written by police, but also victimization
reports.57 According to the National Crime Victim Survey, for
example, “67 percent of the robbery suspects” in the United States in
1973 were African American, a number generated by victims, not
police.58 According to police records, only 63% of all individuals
arrested for robbery during that period were black, a slightly lower
number than victims reported, suggesting that police were actually
falling short in their apprehension of black offenders.59
Not only did blacks disproportionately commit more crime than
whites, argues Latzer, but African Americans were also much more
likely to be the victims of crime than whites. From 1965 to 1973, for
example, “the average homicide mortality rates for nonwhite males
were more than ten times those of whites.”60 Part of this was due to
proximity. “Having migrated to big cities with a high degree of
residential segregation,” argued Latzer, “black people living in poor
communities became easy targets for their more violent neighbors.”61
Behind such numbers, argues Latzer, lurked three structural
causes: (1) a surge in birth rates following World War II, yielding a
disproportionately large population of young men; (2) a mass

54

BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN AMERICA 114, 128 (2016).
See id. at 110-11, 114-15, 152-53, 245.
56
Id. at 131.
57
See id.
58
Id. at 132.
59
Id.
60
See id.
61
Id. at 128.
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migration of southern blacks to the urban North, part of the “Great
Migration”; and (3) an underdeveloped criminal justice system that
actually emboldened crime by failing to maintain order.62
Black crime rates did not stem from biological factors, Latzer is
careful to note, but environmental ones.63 Among these were the
proximity of rich and poor in big cities, where “potential victims”
were plentiful, and the odds of detection slight, due in part to the
“anonymity” of urban areas.64 Also important were economic issues,
including a shrinking job market due to deindustrialization, a
segregated housing market due to discriminatory real estate practices,
and a flight of white tax dollars from urban cores, all factors that
historian Tom Sugrue has coined “the urban crisis.”65 According to
Sugrue, the conditions that led to the urban crisis in Washington,
D.C.and other American cities in the 1970s and 1980sresulted
from major demographic and economic shifts in the United States,
including some of the very same phenomena that Latzer mentions.66
For example, Sugrue joins Latzer in emphasizing the Great
Migration, which intensified in the 1950s and 1960s due to the
mechanization of agriculture, a Braudellian development that drove
thousands of black sharecroppers from the rural South to the urban
North.67 While some of these sharecroppers found adequate housing
and jobs, many did nota problem compounded by the fact that the
jobs the migrants had hoped to obtain, i.e. high paying positions on
assembly lines, disappeared due to automation and outsourcing.68
Meanwhile, little money remained to fill in the gaps. In fact,
public resources evaporated as middle- and upper-middle-class
whites abandoned urban cores for remote suburbs, taking their tax
dollars with them.69 While the reasons for their departure were
myriad, the consequences for urban blacks were dire.70 Those able to

62

Id. at 152–53.
See, e.g., id. (Latzer cites the three principal reasons for the surge in violent crime to be: the
“coming of age” of male baby boomers; an underdeveloped criminal justice system that resulted in
increased crime; and the migration of African Americans from the South to the urban North. All of these
factors are environmental, not biological.).
64
Id. at 77.
65
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR
DETROIT (2005).
66
See id.
67
Id. at 23.
68
Id. at 130–35.
69
Id. at xxii.
70
See id.
63
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find work and housing found themselves pitted against those who did
not, a problem exacerbated by isolation, exclusion, andaccording
to both Latzer and Formancultural baggage from the South.71
As Latzer tells it, southern migrants brought with them
“distinctive norms that support[ed] and encourage[ed] violence,”
including a culture of honor that descended from nineteenth century
whites but was adopted by twentieth century blacks, to catastrophic
effect.72 Suddenly trapped in crowded but crumbling urban cores,
blacks came into more frequent conflict with one another as they
struggled for resources, and turned to violence as a result.73 Drugs
factored in here, providing some with an outlet for depression, and
others an illicit means of earning a living, though not without risk.74
Guns provided security, violence resolved disputes between rival
dealers, and crime spiked.75
But most blacks did not commit crime. As Forman explains it,
most African Americans brought with them not a culture of criminal
violence from the South, but criminal punishment.76 Black ministers,
argues Forman, along with their congregations, viewed the rise in
urban crime in Washington, D.C. and cities like it through a rural,
Old Testament lens.77 As white liberals lobbied for treatment to
lessen a heroin epidemic, for example, black ministers balked, opting
instead for punishment.78 And, as white liberals lobbied for
decriminalization of substances like marijuana, black ministers
balked again, arguing for prohibition.79 Both stances were classic
evangelical positions, positions that actually united Protestants, white
and black, across the South and Midwest.80
IV. CONCLUSION

As Forman suggests, the origins of mass incarceration in the
United States lie not simply in reconfigurations of racial animus, as

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

LATZER, supra note 54, at 50–57, 164.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 50-57, 164.
See id. at 175–82.
See id. at 178–79.
See FORMAN, supra note 49, at 17–46, 65–66.
Id. at 31–32, 40, 42–43.
Id. at 31–33.
Id. at 44–45.
See id at 17–46.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310483

2011]

Freedom and Prison

13

Alexander maintains, but much deeper structures as well.81 Among
them were technological shifts that brought black migrants out of the
South and then left them struggling to find work in a postindustrial,
urban landscape.82 Complicating this were depletions in urban
services, wrought by departures of middle- and upper-middle-class
urbanites, coupled with poorly-funded police forces, and an
overwhelmed criminal justice system.83
Such forces left African Americans trapped in urban cores with
few options for dealing with unemployment, substandard housing,
and poor education, all factors that contributed to spikes in crime.84
Complicating this was heroin and other narcotics, which flooded
urban streets in the 1970s and contributedalong with a profusion of
firearmsto the creation of violent, illicit markets.85 Though such
markets provided some with an alternate means of survival, they
instilled in others a sense that more prisons and police were necessary
to restore order.
Missing were services, or what Forman calls a “Marshall Plan,”
for urban America that African Americans hoped for but never
received.86 Had such a plan been implemented, with jobs, housing,
health care, education, and other forms of support, crime may never
have reached the levels that it did, and calls for prisons and police
may have subsided. However, voters turned the opposite way,
moving away from Johnson-era calls for a Great Society and towards
a more punitive model, a choice that Forman argues was not simply a
plot to reinstate racial caste in the post-Jim Crow era, but a byproduct
of a deep-seated belief in moral choice, personal responsibility, and
punishment.87
The extent to which popular support for punishment drew
strength from latent racism is not clear. Alexander argues that it was
the single largest factor behind the punitive turn in American criminal
justice, a point that could conceivably be explained by the holdover
of a racialist mentalité in the United States following the Civil Rights
Era, a mentalité reinforced, ironically, by spikes in black crime.
Though Alexander does not mention it, for example, her theory of

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

See id. at 10–14.
See LATZER, supra note 54, at 152–53.
See FORMAN, supra note 49, at 12.
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animus could actually be strengthened if it were cast as a response, in
part, to the crime wave of the 1960s and 1970s. Such a claim, were it
true, would be a more accurate, structuralist account of why animus
drove the war on drugs, an account free from speculative claims
about human nature, but istill supportive of Alexander’s theory. Put
another way, conservative whites found their racialist theories
confirmed once they read news accounts of black crime.
Of course, such a conclusion would lend itself to a different set of
policy implications than straightforward criminal justice reform.
According to Forman, America’s affinity for incarceration stems
from even deeper roots than its views on race, roots linked to biblical
notions of punishment and personal moral responsibility.88 Such
ideas are religious in origin, not racist, and tie in closely to core
American ideals, including the idea of freedom of religion, freedom
of expression, and liberty itself.
In all fifty states, for example, criminal codes focus on personal
moral choice as the basis for punishment, ignoring structural causes
of crime. An individual’s limited number of choices, limited number
of opportunities, or limited education is irrelevant to whether or not
they will be punished. Children of poor migrants, who leave one
region for another, fail to find jobs, and end up trapped in isolated,
crumbling urban cores, are treated no differently from children of
privileged elites who are born into wealth and opportunity.
Further, American law limits what the government can do for
minorities, particularly racial minorities, in the interest of preserving
liberty. In a string of cases handed down during the era of mass
incarceration, the United States Supreme Court put a series of
roadblocks in the way of structural reform. Among these were San
Antonio v. Rodriguez, which upheld disparate funding of public
schools;89 Milliken v. Bradley, which prevented multidistrict
solutions to problems of segregation, white flight, and urban
isolation;90 and Regents v. Bakke, which declared programs
specifically aimed at addressing generalized past harm a violation of
equal protection.91 All of these opinions drew inspiration from the
Court’s stated commitment to limiting state power and preserving, to
the greatest extent possible, personal libertyincluding the liberty to
88
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move from place to place, whether from South to North or city to
suburb, unregulated.
Because most Americanswhite and blackbelieve in
individual liberty and personal moral responsibility, we are poorly
equipped to address problems that are structural in origin. This
includes problems of racial animus, which draw strength from deep
seated mentalités but are hard to eradicateparticularly when the
Constitution protects racist speechas well as deeper problems of
demographics, economics, and limited government power. To note
this, however, is not to detract from Alexander’s story of mass
incarceration, but to put it on a more structuralist footing.
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